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Abstract 
This article examines and analyses Japan’s current interest in the 
South China Sea, by first alluding to the historical context of that country’s 
involvement from the mid-1930s to the end of the Pacific War, 1945. It then 
outlines Japan’s energy security needs and that country’s national policy 
relating to securing safety for its flagged ships and those vessels assisting in 
promoting Japan’s export and import and the diplomatic role that Japan plays 
towards regional stability. Japan in their Diplomatic Bluebook stated that the 
priorityforJapanis to guaranteethe securityandprosperity of the countryand its 
people. Here,it is clear thatthe Japanese Government will trytodo everything 
togive the besttoensure their survival. Japan’s interest in South China Sea is 
because it is deemed critical for the Japanese security. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The genuine concerns for and 
interest of Japan in the activities of the 
South China Sea is evident from a 
published document by that country’s 
Ministry of Defence in 2013 in which it 
stated that; “The independent state of a 
nation must be protected in order for it to 
maintain the determining of its own 
direction in politics, economy, and society, 
as well as its culture, tradition, and sense 
of values. However, peace, safety and 
independence cannot be secured by simply 
wishing for them.1 
Geopolitical tensions continued to 
simmer in the South China Sea throughout 
2013 as evident in the national and 
international electronic and print media 
and the attention given to this regional 
semi-enclosed sea in the numerous 
international and regional for held 
annually. After the US President Obama 
administration’s declaration in 2009 of a 
US ‘return to Asia’ stirred up regional 
dynamics non-claimant states, India and 
Japan, entered into the fray. There are 
various reasons for these activities: oil and 
gas exploration and exploitation and 
ensuring security of important sea routes. 
                                                          
1Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2013. 
Tokyo. [online version] 
http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2013/01
.pdf  [August, 3 2016] 
The quotation at the top of the page well 
illustrates the concerns from all quarters. 
First, the South China Sea is home to 
some of the world’s busiest sea lines of 
communication (SLOCs), which would be 
disrupted, should an armed conflict erupt. 
Second, there is the potential for non-
claimant states to get involved in the 
exploration and exploitation of marine 
hydrocarbon reserves in the region through 
joint ventures with claimant states in their 
perceived exclusive economic zones. 
Third, having a voice in a major regional 
security issue confers prestige 
commensurate with regional power status. 
Finally, involvement in the South China 
Sea issue could have implications on other 
territorial disputes.  
This present study will allude to 
Japan’s energy dependence and then 
analyse national policy of self-sufficiency, 
energy and maritime security, maritime 
self-defence and its involvement in the 
affairs of its southern neighbours, 
especially the littoral states of the South 
China Sea. 
Japan and Its Energy Dependence  
During 2010, energy needs 
requirementsbyJapanwere42per centoil, 
22per centcoal,18per centgas, 13per 
centnuclear, and fourpercentof 
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resourcesareother sources(EIA Online, 
2010). From these, Japan relied on oil 
imports to meet about 42 percent. It also 
relied on LNG imports for virtually all of 
its natural gas demand and it is the world's 
largest LNG importer. Actually, Japan has 
32 of its owned operating terminals where 
majority terminals are located in Tokyo, 
Osaka and Nagoya but the terminals are 
notabletoaccommodate theneedsof LNG. 
Indonesia became the world largest LNG 
exporter in the world.2 Japan has a large 
volume of imported LNG passes through 
the Indonesian archipelagic waters. The 
Japanese government ordered its Maritime 
Self-Defence Force (MSDF) to consider 
how it might protect Japanese vessels 
using these sea-lanes of communications.  
The country was the world's third 
largest producer of nuclear power after the 
US and France before the Fukushima 
Daiichi nuclear power plant accident in 
March 2011. Japan's nuclear regulator 
stated on Thursday, 4 July 2013, that 
elevating safety culture to international 
standards will "take a long time", days 
before new rules come into effect to avoid 
                                                          
2Raj, A. Japan's Initiatives in Security Cooperation 
in the Straits of Malacca on maritime security and 
in Southeast Asia: Piracy and Maritime 
Terrorism.The Japan Institute for International 
Affairs (JIIA), (2009) 
 
a repeat of the Fukushima nuclear disaster 
in March 2011.3 
Japan's nuclear regulator expressed 
growing alarm on Wednesday, 10 July 
2013, at increased contamination at the 
adjacent seafront of the stricken 
Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station 
and urged the plan’s operators to take 
protective measures.4 Fukushima's 
operator, Tokyo Electric Power Co., has 
acknowledged problems are mounting at 
the plant north of Tokyo, the site of the 
world's worst atomic disaster since 
Chernobyl in 1986. The company 
observed that the day earlier radiation 
levels in groundwater had soared, 
suggesting highly toxic materials from the 
plant were getting closer to the Pacific 
more than two years after three meltdowns 
triggered by a massive earthquake and 
tsunami. The NRA strongly suspected 
radiation was contaminating the Pacific, 
Kyodo news agency said in an earlier 
report from a weekly NRA commission 
meeting. 
Japan has limited domestic energy 
resources and is only about 16 per cent 
self-sufficient and is the third largest oil 
                                                          
3www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-nuclear-
idUSBRE96309M20130704 (July 4, 2014) 
 
4 Aaron Sheldrick and Kentaro Hamada ‘Japan says 
building nuclear safety culture will take a long 
time’(05-Jul-13) 
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consumer in the world after the United 
States of America (USA) and the Peoples’ 
Republic of China (PRC). It is also the 
largest importer of liquefied natural gas 
(LNG) and the second largest importer of 
coal. The LNG and coal commodities are 
imported from sources in Southeast Asia 
and Australia, but are not limited to these 
geographical areas. The oil is sourced from 
reserves in the Persian Gulf equating to 
nearly 75 per cent as depicted in Figure 2. 
Figure 2: Japan’s crude oil imports 
by source (geographic region), 2011 
Japan has very limited domestic oil 
reserves, amounting to 44 million barrels 
as of January 2012, according to the Oil 
and Gas Journal (OGJ), down from the 58 
million barrels reported by OGJ in 2007. 
Japan's domestic oil reserves are 
concentrated primarily along the country's 
western coastline. Offshore areas 
surrounding Japan, such as the East China 
Sea, also contain oil and gas deposits; 
however, development of these zones is 
held up by competing territorial claims 
with China. While a preliminary accord 
was reached between the two governments 
in May 2008 over two fields - 
Chunxiao/Shirakaba andLongjing/Asunaro 
- in September 2010, Japan urged China to 
implement the agreement as tensions rose 
over the contested area. 
Consequently, Japan relies heavily 
on imports to meet its consumption needs. 
Japan maintains government-controlled oil 
stocks to ensure against a supply 
interruption. Total strategic oil stocks in 
Japan were 589 million barrels at the end 
of December 2011, with 55 per cent being 
government stocks and 45 per cent 
commercial stocks.5 
Japanese oil companies have sought 
participation in exploration and production 
projects overseas with government 
backing because of the country’s lack of 
domestic oil resources. The government’s 
2006 energy strategy plan encouraged 
Japanese companies to increase energy 
exploration and development projects 
around the world to secure a stable supply 
of oil and natural gas. The Japan Bank for 
International Cooperation supports 
upstream companies by offering loans at 
                                                          
5Energy International Agency. Oil and Gas 
Emergency Response of EIA Country,(2013). 
https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/p
ublication/2013_OSS_Japan.pdf(accessed August 
18, 2016) 
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favourable rates, thereby allowing 
Japanese companies to bid effectively for 
projects in key producing countries. Such 
financial support helps Japanese 
companies to purchase stakes in oil and 
gas fields around the world, reinforcing 
national supply security while 
guaranteeing their own financial stability. 
The government's goal is to import 40 per 
cent of the country's total crude oil imports 
from Japanese-owned concessions by 
2030, up from the current estimated 19 per 
cent. 
Japan's overseas oil projects are 
primarily located in the Middle East and 
Southeast Asia; however, their geographic 
scope is much wider. Japanese oil 
companies involved in exploration and 
production projects overseas include: 
Inpex, Cosmo Oil, Idemitsu Kosan Co., 
Japan Energy Development Corporation, 
Japex, Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Nippon Oil, and 
others. Many of these companies are 
involved in small-scale projects that were 
originally set up by JNOC.6 However, 
many are involved in high-profile 
upstream projects involving major 
                                                          
6Analysis Report on Japan. 2013. 
http://www.connaissancedesenergies.org/sites/defa
ult/files/pdf-pt-
vue/anlysis_report_on_japan.pdf(accessed August 
18, 2016) 
 
investments in overseas ventures in recent 
years.  
Most of Japan's LNG imports 
originate from regional suppliers in 
Southeast Asia, although the country has a 
fairly balanced portfolio with no one 
supplier having a market share greater than 
roughly 20 per cent. Japan's top five gas 
suppliers make up 73 per cent of the 
market share. After the March 2011 
disaster, several suppliers from Qatar, 
Russia, Malaysia and Indonesia exported 
cargoes to Japan through swaps and 
diverted cargoes. Qatar, the world's largest 
supplier of flexible LNG, overtook 
Indonesia as the third largest supplier to 
Japan in 2011 and provided most of the 
additional imports needed after the 
earthquake under short-term agreements. 
Japanese utility companies signed 
agreements with Qatar Gas at the end of 
2011 to secure longer term LNG supply.  
The pie-graph in Figure 3 amply 
illustrates the geographical scope from 
which Japan sources its import of LNG to 
supply its domestic energy needs. Nearly 
85 per cent of this importation is 
transported by specially designed ships 
navigating along the sea lanes of the South 
China Sea many using the geographic 
restrictions of straits and channels within 
the semi-enclosed seas of South East Asia, 
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and in particular, the Indonesian and 
Philippine archipelagos.7 
Figure 3: Japan’s LNG imports by source 
(geographic region) 2011 
Japan installed hydroelectric 
generating capacity of 48 GW in 2009, 
accounting for about 16 per cent of total 
electricity capacity. About half of this 
capacity is pumped storage with another 5 
GW scheduled to come online by 2020. 
Like nuclear power, hydropower is a 
source for base load generation in Japan 
because of the low generation costs and 
stable supply. Hydroelectric generation 
was 73 TWh in 2010, making up about 7 
per cent of total net generation. The 
Japanese government has been promoting 
small hydropower projects to serve local 
communities through subsidies and by 
simplifying procedures.  
Wind, solar, and tidal powers are 
being actively pursued in the country and 
installed capacity from these sources has 
                                                          
7UNCTAD. Review of Maritime Transport, (2011) 
 
increased in recent years to about 4.6 GW 
in 2009, up from 0.8 GW in 2004. 
However, they continue to account for a 
relatively small share of generation at this 
time.  
As part of the revised energy policy 
plan, Japan is trying to encourage a greater 
use of renewable energy, from sources 
such as sea water, solar, wind, geothermal, 
hydropower, and biomass, for power 
generation. Non-nuclear renewable energy 
made up about 4 per cent of Japan's total 
energy consumption and about 2 per cent 
of the country's electricity generation in 
2010. The Japanese legislature approved 
an act, which was enacted in July 2012, 
compelling electric utilities to purchase 
electricity generated by renewable fuel 
sources, except for nuclear, at fixed feed-
in tariff prices. The costs are to be shared 
by government subsidies and the end 
users, though details of the act, particularly 
the tariff price, are not entirely defined. 
We have just alluded to the energy 
supply and needs of Japan and hence that 
country’s interest in ensuring that the sea 
lanes of communication in the South 
China Sea are always free  and safe for 
navigation at the present and in the future. 
However, it is interesting to discuss 
briefly, the historical interest from an 
historical perspective.  
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Maritime Security  
Southeast Asia is home to important 
sea-lanes and straits including Straits of 
Malacca Singapore, Sunda, and Lombok.8 
The security of the Straits of Malacca and 
Singapore became an international concern 
and the straits have been the core reasons 
of maritime security cooperation between 
countries from within and outside 
Southeast Asia.9 In Southeast Asia, the 
multilateral and bilateral agreements or 
other cooperative efforts to enhance 
maritime security have been implemented 
and discussed since 1992 and resulting in 
the ASEAN Declaration on the South 
China Sea in the same year. More than half 
of the world’s annual merchant fleet 
tonnage passes through the Straits of 
Malacca and Singapore, Sunda, and 
Lombok, with the majority continuing on 
into the South China Sea.10 
Oil tanker traffic through the Strait 
of Malacca leading into the South China 
Sea is more than three times greater than 
                                                          
8Liss, C. ,The Privatisation of Maritime Security- 
Maritime Security in Southeast  Asia: Between 
a rock and a hard place?,” Asia  Research paper 
Perth: Murdoch University, (2010) 
 
9Vavro, C. ,“Piracy, Terrorism and the Balance of 
Power in the Malacca Strait,”Canadian Naval 
Reviewvol 4, no 1 (spring,2008)  
 
10Sien, C. L. “The Importance of the Straits of 
Malacca and Singapore,”Singapore 
 Journal of International & Comparative 
Law (1998) 
Suez Canal traffic, and well over five 
times more than the Panama Canal. 
According to Malaysia Vessel Traffic 
System (VTS) in 2001, the ships transiting 
through Strait of Malacca was 59,314 and 
that increased to 70,718 ships in 2007. In 
2012, the number of ships traversing the 
Strait of Malacca was 75,477.  
Virtually all shipping that passes 
through the Malacca and Sunda Straits 
must pass near the Spratly Islands – the   
Dangerous Grounds as delineated on 
nautical charts as indicated in Figure 3, 
above. From about the mid-1990s, the 
threat at the sea to merchant navy ships 
was mostly by non-traditional security 
elements such as piracy, terrorism, 
smuggling of all types of commodities and 
especially military armament. According 
to the Japan Coast Guard (JCG), the 
number of piracy and armed robbery 
incidents in South China Sea consists of 
242 cases in 2000 and decrease to 83 cases 
in 2007. In 2012, the cases up to 104. 
By mid-2013, this semi-enclosed sea 
and adjacent waters was relatively free 
from the scourge of piracy; however, the 
underlying concern is that of freedom of 
navigation. Japan continues its concern 
about anti-piracy efforts by actively 
canvassing support for the United Nations 
Security Council (UNSC) so asto obtain a 
permanent membership within UNSC. The 
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Multilayered and Cooperative 
SecurityStrategy will be introduced as a 
new security framework for Japan. This 
will also allow the Japanese Self-Defence 
Forces to address the overall security 
issues pertaining to Japan as well as 
elements in the issues to piracy and 
maritime terrorism. 
Figure 4: Major crude oil flows in the 
South China Sea (2011) Source: USA EIA 
<accessed 25 July 2013> 
The large volume of shipping in the 
South China Sea/Strait of Malacca littoral 
has created opportunities for attacks on 
merchant shipping; in 1995, almost half of 
the world's reported cases of piracy 
occurred in this area. In 2000, the number 
of piracy and armed robbery incidents in 
Straits of Malacca and Singapore 
amounted to 242 cases, and decreased to 
16 cases in 2006. 11Fortunately, for the 
                                                          
11 Evers, H.D. & Gerke,S. The Strategic 
Importance of the Straits of Malacca for  
World Trade and Regional Development, Jerman: 
University of Bonn (2005)  
 
international community and the shipping 
industry in general the number of cases 
reported in 2012 was a mere eight. (IMB 
2013) For this sole reason, the 
Government of Japan through the Japan 
Foundation contributedfinancially by 
offeringtrainingandnavigationfacilities to 
the littoral States of Malacca and 
Singapore Straits under the auspices of the 
Malacca Straits Council to facilitate and 
regulate the activities ofships. In 2009, the 
Japan Foundationdonated USD 2.5 million 
to the Malacca Straits Council.12 
Shipping (by tonnage) in the South 
China Sea is dominated by raw materials 
en route to the East Asian countries. 
Tonnage via Malacca and the Spratly 
Islands is dominated by liquid bulk such as 
crude oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG), 
with dry bulk (mostly coal and iron ore) in 
second place. Nearly 66 per cent of the 
tonnage passing through the Strait of 
Malacca, and half of the volume passing 
the Spratly Islands, is crude oil from the 
Persian Gulf. The oil tanker traffic through 
the Straits of Malacca and Singapore rose 
to 13.8 million barrels per day (bbl/d) 
during 2007 and the amount increased to 
                                                          
12Mohd Hazmi Rusli,. “The Legal Feasibility of the 
Imposition of a Traffic  Limitation Scheme in 
Straits Used for International Navigation: A Study 
of  the Straits of Malacca and 
Singapore,”.International Journal of Humanities 
and Social Science Vol.1 No.6 (2011) 
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15.2 million bbl/d in 2011. The rising 
Asian oil demand could result in a 
doubling of these flows over the next two 
decades.  
LNG shipments through the South 
China Sea constitute two-thirds of the 
world’s overall LNG trade. Japan is the 
recipient of the bulk of these shipments; in 
1996 Japan was dependent upon LNG for 
over 11% of its total energy supplies. 
(Dzurek, 1985) South Korea (over seven 
per cent of energy consumption) and 
Taiwan (over four per cent of energy 
consumption) also import large amounts of 
LNG via the South China Sea.  During 
2010, Japan import 3.4 Trillion Cubic Feet 
(Tcf) LNG and in rose up to 3.8 Tfc in 
2011 (EIA). 
The other major shipping lane in the 
region uses the Lombok and Makassar 
Straits, and continues into the Philippine 
Sea. Except for north-south traffic from 
Australia, it is not used as extensively as 
the Strait of Malacca and the South China 
Sea, since for most voyages it represents a 
longer voyage by several hundred miles. 
By using the Straits of Malacca and 
Singapore, Japanese shipping companies 
could potentially save more yen per 
kilometre and travel time would be 
shortened (Ever & Gerke 2005). If, 
however, the shipping companies choose 
to use the Lombok and Makassar Straits, 
they would at least add 30 yen for each 
kilometre or expend USD 1.2 billion 
annually with additional times to two 
weeks using tanker.13 
Thus the maritime security within 
the semi-enclosed seas of South East Asia 
is of prime importance to ensure 
commercial, economic and social security 
stability for the region and in particular for 
Japan. Maritime terrorism is another 
problem that every maritime nation has to 
devote attention to. In the early-2000s, 
terrorist organizations executed a number 
of serious attacks on targets in maritime 
Southeast Asia. In 2000 and 2001, the Abu 
Sayyaff Group (ASG), operating by boat, 
kidnapped local citizens and international 
holiday makers from resorts on Sipadan 
and Palawan Islands. The Southeast Asian 
states that had taken collective positive 
action towards these activities succeeded 
in decreasing the number of attacks at 
sea.14  In March 2010, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, and Singapore announced 
increase security measures in response to a 
                                                          
13Wan Siti Adibah, Zinatul Ashiqin, Noor Inayah 
&Noridayu, “Corporate Social Responsibility 
(CSR) from Shipping Companies in the Straits of 
Malacca and Singapore,”International Journal of 
Business and Society 13(2), (2012) 
 
14 Hoadley,S. & Ruland, J, Asian Security 
Reassessed. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies (2006) 
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warning that terrorists were planning to 
attack oil tankers in the Malacca Strait. 
Economic and Military Rise of China: 
Concern for Japan  
The economic and military rise of China is 
not a minor issue to Japan. China became 
one of the biggest competitors in East Asia 
and currently in South Sea.15 China joined 
World Trade Organization (WTO) in 
2001. This was an opportunity for China to 
open its economy to the world and become 
fully integrated with the international 
trading system. A free market policy has 
enhanced China’s economy and made that 
country more productive and promote 
enhanced industrial practices. Competition 
in trading has compelled Chinese 
companies to improve their technology 
and management to reach international 
standards.  
In 2011, China boosted its economy 
and was second after USA. This situation 
really gave tension to Japan to re-maintain 
its economy because China offered a vast 
market and a multitude of workers. 
Besides, the cheaper goods from China re-
                                                          
15B.J Ahn, “The Rise of China and the Future of 
East Asian Integration,”Asia-Pacific Review 11(2): 
22-32 (2004) & G.Christofferson, “Japan and The 
East Asian Maritime Security order: prospect for 
trilateral and multilateral cooperation,”Asian 
Perspective  33(3), (2009): 107-149. 
 
aligned the balance of trade between the 
countries to China rather than Japan. In 
economic terms, the increase inthe value 
ofmerchandise gave huge opportunities to 
China. In a report from United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) in 2008, China’strade 
valueexceededJapan’sin 2005. This 
situation continueduntil 2007. Japan had 
only a modest economy in 2001; however, 
after that country experienced three 
economic recessions since 2008, a 
downturn in trade investment and global 
demand for Japan's exports in late 2008 
pushed the country into recession. 
China’s rapid economic rose 
threatened Japan. China imported 80 per 
cent of its energy through the Straits of 
Malacca and Singapore into South China 
Sea.16Japan's economyis notgrowingata 
goodratesince 2001. Government stimulus 
spending helped the economy recover in 
late-2009 and 2010, but the economy 
showed contraction again in 2011 as the 
massive 9.0 magnitude earthquake. Not 
only that, the tsunami in March once again 
disrupted manufacturing.  
                                                          
16H.Yu, “China's Perspectives on the Straits of 
Malacca. In Nazery Khalid (edt.),” Proceeding of 
the 6th MIMA International Conference on the 
Straits of Malacca: Charting the Future, (2009): 
22-24. MIMA &L.Spittena “The Malacca 
Dilemma” —countering China’s “string of pearls” 
with land-based airpower. Alabama: Air University 
(USAF), (2006) 
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Japandoes not wantChinato beits 
competitor becauseit recognises thepower 
of theChinesenationina big market, blessed 
with abundant 
resourcesandcheaplabourwhich could 
potentially threaten itspositionin the 
region.17 In 2009, China’s trade increased 
to USD 5 trillion and the nation’s 
purchasing power approached the stage of 
USD 8.7 trillion.18Chinaimportsvast 
quantities ofenergyresources makes it 
reliant on energy resource-rich countries. 
Chinahas positionedintoanewworld 
economicpowerwhereChina's economic 
slowdownwillpresentan 
adverseimpactontheglobal economy. 
The market power transition from 
Japan to China indirectly brought about a 
reduction of dependency on the other 
states toward Japan.19 The rise of China’s 
image in the South East Asia destabilised 
Japan's geopolitical stance.20 Not only that, 
                                                          
17Rusdi Omar,“China dan Kuasa Hegemoni Baru 
Ekonomi,” (2006) http:// 
www.ijms.uum.edu.my/ijms 14(1). [Accessed 
December, 6 2012] 
 
18J.M. Rathus, Japan response to the rise of China: 
Implication to regional Institution. (2010) 
Australia: University of Adelaide 
19R.J. Samuels, R. Tokyo grand strategy and the 
future of East Asia securing Japan. (2008)London: 
Cornell University Press 
20 L.Kyung, Move over Japan: China is now No. 2 
world economy. 
more multinational companies set up their 
businesses and factories in China. Vast 
quantities of manufactured goods are 
exported to South East Asia countries, for 
example, Laos, Cambodia, Myanmar and 
Thailand.21 
Increasedpolitical influence 
ofChinainSoutheast Asiaactuallyserves a 
bitter blow tothe Japanesebecause they 
realizeasa smallcountrywithfewer natural 
resources. Ifthis situation continues,there 
is a potential to causea threat tothe 
nationalsecurity ofthe countryboth 
economicallyand socially.22 Japan has 
realisedeven though sometimes China is 
quiteaggressiveinactingon the issue of 
securingits territories, it is 
alsotolerantincertaincircumstancessuch 
aseconomiccooperation. For example 
China donated USD 1.7 million to 
ASEAN to fundcollaborative projectsthat 
will benefit theregionand 
                                                                                    
Retrieved from 
http://money.cnn.com/2011/02/13/news/internation
al/china_overtakes_japan_economy.cnnw/index.ht
m [July 16, 2013] 
21N.Mashashi, Japan's Political and Security 
Relations with ASEAN.(2003) Tokyo:  Japan 
Centre for International Exchange 
22A.L. Oros, “Japan’s Security Future,” The 
Routledge Handbook of Asian Security 
Studies.London(Routledge:2010) 
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alsogave300,000tons of rice 
foremergency.23 
In the security context, China’s 
riseleads tothe existence ofthe 
securitydilemmabetween thetwocountries. 
China’s military modernisation assets 
convince many that the country is 
preparing itself for war. In addition, the 
aggressiveness of China in South China 
Sea portrays an impression that China will 
never compromise about their claimed 
territory and anything owned by 
themselves. China is viewed as a threat to 
Japan in South China Sea.24The increase 
inthe governmentbudgetallocated 
fordefence spendingin Chinahasmade
Japanfeel threatened.25 
In 2001, China announced an 
increase in its defence expenditure as 
being 17.7 per cent higher and larger than 
the previous over two decades (Hoesslin 
2004). By 2004, China once again 
                                                          
23P. ELam, & G.Narayanan,"China and East Asia: 
Mutual Accommodation. In.  Lam,  P. E & 
Dürkop, C.  East Asia's Relations with a Rising 
China.(2008) Japan: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung 
24C.W Pumphrey, (Ed), “The rise of China in Asia: 
Security Implications,”(2002) U.S. Army War 
College &J.M Rathus, “Japan response to the rise 
of China: Implication to regional Institution,” 
(2010)  Australia: University of Adelaide 
25H.Tanaka, “Nationalistic Sentiment in Japan and 
Their Foreign Policy  Implications,” East Asia 
Insights Vol.2, No 1 (2008) 
 
announced that it would increase the 
defence budget to USD 25 
billion.26Chinahas 
beenmodernizingandaddednewfacilitiesfor
its navy andthe air force.China'sactionsare 
perceived by the Government of Japan as 
encroaching on its market territoryand 
hence have an impact onstabilityinthe 
South China Sea.Ifthis situation continues, 
it is possible thatChinawillcontinueits 
actionuntil it reachesthe Straits of 
Malacca.  
China also has not clarified the status 
of its military modernisation programme 
and the transparency of its policies. Does it 
have to make tis public? By not 
elaborating on these policies it could be 
argued that there is a possibility that this 
could lead to a sense of distrust and 
misunderstandings by other countries. 
Furthermore, China has been expanding 
and intensifying its activities in the East 
China Sea – waters close to Japan. 
Together with the lack of transparency in 
its military and security affairs has become 
a concern for Japan as a neighbour. The 
countries have a war history. These are 
why China is asked to further improve 
transparency regarding its military and try 
                                                          
26Mokhzani Zubir&Mohd Nizam Basiron, The 
Straits of Malacca: the Rise of  China, 
America’s Intentions and the Dilemma of the 
Littoral States. MIMA(2005) 
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to strengthening mutual understanding by 
promoting dialogues in an important issue. 
China basically only announced the total 
amount for the three categories consist of 
personnel, training and maintenance and 
equipment.  
The report for the United Nations 
Instrument for Reporting Military 
Expenditures submitted by China in 2009 
was not filled out in accordance with the 
standard format used by other nations, 
including Japan, which required a detailed 
breakdown of military expenditure. The 
information disclosed in the report 
submitted by China was almost as simple 
as that provided in China’s defence white 
papers. In the report China only provided 
details of personnel expenses, operation 
maintenance costs and equipment costs by 
naval, air force and armies.  
The Government of Japan has felt 
uneasywithChinaas that country is 
allegedly modernisingits nuclear 
andweapons of mass destruction.27Eventhe 
reliabilityofChinais 
alsoquestionablebecause ofan increase 
inadditions ofmilitary hardware 
onlydemonstrates that this countryis 
                                                          
27E. Atanassova- Cornelis,“The US-Japan Alliance 
and the Rise of China:  Implications for the East 
Asian Security order and the EU's Regional 
Role,”Brussels: Paper for the International 
Conference(2010) 
preparing tofacea war situation. 
AlthoughChinahas repeatedly statedthe 
modernisationof weapons and its nuclear 
capability isfor the use in thecountry, but it 
still does notchange theJapan's perceptions 
Thedevelopment ofmilitary 
assetscancauseotherneighbouring countries 
to feel uneasywiththissituation. Whilst 
several neighbouring countries had to slash 
their budget expenditure others had 
moderate increases.28 In the future, this 
situation can cause the competition of 
defence modernisation. Because of the rise 
in military power of China, the 
USAdeliveredmore naval shipsto some 
Asia-Pacificcountries. The Government of 
Japanbelieves thatinthe nextten years, 
China’sdominancein the military 
fieldwillbewell advanced. The military co-
operation with USA will no longer be able 
to prevent China's action.  
For this precise the reason the 
Government of Japan believed that if they 
brought USA in this regional equation, it 
would be balancing China military 
might.29 Not only that, Japan also believed 
                                                          
28 S.S Jatswan, K.S  Balakrisnan, Trends in 
Maritime Security and Geopolitics  in Southeast 
Asia. In. The Seas Divide: Geopolitics and 
Maritime IssuesinSoutheast Asia. Kuala Lumpur: 
Institute of Ocean and Earth Sciences. (2008), 1-7 
 
29K.V Kesavan, “Japan and ASEAN: Their 
Changing Security Relations,”New Delhi:Observer 
Research Foundation(2011) 
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a very good co-operation with USA will 
make the country stable and safe because 
geographically Japan is only a tiny country 
compared to China. China’s increasing 
nuclear deterrence capabilities base in 
South China Sea would affect Japan’s core 
interest now and in the future.30 
Japan’s Contemporary Involvement  
In responding to the rise of economic 
and military rise of China in the South 
China Sea, Japan has commenced its basic 
international policy through engagement 
with ASEAN countries to gain mutual 
reassurance. Japan is using the three pillars 
of engagement which are Official 
Development Assistance (ODA), capacity 
building and dialogue.31 
Japan has to have a close 
relationship with USA so as to balance the 
rise of China in the East and South China 
Seas. This is will fine-tune the good 
influence for Japan in terms of 
strengthening and support when it is faced 
                                                          
30M.J Green, Asia in the Debate on American 
Grand Strategy”, Naval War  College Review 
(2009) , Retrieved from 
http://www.usnwc.edu/Publications/Naval- War-
College-Review/2009---Winter.aspx [July 15, 
2013] 
31S.M. Tang, “Japan’s Grand Strategic Shift from 
Yoshida to Koizumi: Reflections on Japan’s 
Strategic Focus in the 21st century,”Akademika vol 
70. Bil 1 (2007) 
 
with a security crisis. The USA and Japan 
have shared common strategic interests in 
maritime Southeast Asia. Both allies rely 
upon the safe and secure sea lines of 
communication that pass through the 
region. Therefore, it is natural for the USA 
and Japan to look for opportunities to 
increase their cooperation in maritime 
Southeast Asia. Japan’s strategic outlook 
creates opportunities for such co-operation 
so long as it is implemented in concert 
with host nation priorities.   
In 2008, the Japanese government 
announced Japan Maritime Self Defence’s 
(JMSDF) new maritime era ( MoD 2012) 
The objectives of the JMSDF are to 
prevent any threat from reaching crisis 
point; to repel it and minimize any 
damage; to improve the international 
security environment; and, to reduce the 
chances that any threat will reach Japan in 
the first place.32 The role of the defence 
force in these initiatives are to be an 
effective response to the new threats and 
diverse situations, as preparations to deal 
with full-scale invasion and lastly as a 
proactive efforts to improve the 
international security environment. 
                                                          
32Japan Ministry of Defense. JMSDF:What is the 
Japan Maritime Self Defense Force?:Main 
operations.(2014)http://www.mod.go.jp/msdf/form
al/ english/ about/ operation/ index.html [10 Des 
2014]. 
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To achieve these objectives, JMSDF 
needs to constantly conduct patrol and 
surveillance in their surrounding waters in 
peace time, and to prevent the emergence 
of situations, while maintaining a system 
that enables immediate response once the 
situation arises. Generally naval forces 
(including JMSDF) are granted various 
privileges under the international laws 
during peace time, enabling them to act 
freely as the embodiment of nation 
sovereign, to navigate necessary waters 
without impairing the rights and interests 
of surrounding countries, and to 
demonstrate national wills when the 
situation calls for.33 
JMSDF needs to utilize these 
characteristics to secure the safety and 
stability of overseas maritime trade and 
cargo transportation. For this purpose, it 
needs to promote international cooperation 
with the US as an ally and other reliable 
partners for maintaining relevant major 
international systems and the security of 
sea lines of communication. For Japan, to 
secure the safe and stable maritime 
navigation is the very foundation of its 
maritime security concern. 
Japan treasures its cooperative 
ventures with ASEAN countries because it 
                                                          
33 T. Kotani, “Struggle over EZZs: Japan's Interests 
in South China Sea,”  MIMA  Conference 
Report.(2012) 
realises that if the littoral States of the 
South China Sea do not cooperate each 
other, all its efforts are wasted. In 2000, 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry 
of Land, Infrastructure and Transport and 
the Japan Coast Guard organized a 
regional conference on combating piracy 
and armed robbery supported by the 
Nippon Foundation. Coast guard agencies, 
maritime policy makers, ship-owners 
associations the IMOand ten 
ASEANmembers were represented the 
conference. 
As a result of the conference a 
“Model Action Plan”was drawn up in 
indicating specific guidelines to be 
followed by maritime policy makers and 
private-sector parties in maritime issues 
pertaining to piracy and armed robbery 
from the coast guard efforts to tackle the 
problem.34 
Japan’s concerns within the seas and 
straits and Southeast Asia has resulted in 
closer cooperation and capacity-building 
programs with the Straits of Malacca's 
littoral states as well as its newer 
initiatives towards Thailand and the other 
Asiannations in terms of maritime security 
cooperation. Japan has long cooperated 
                                                          
34H.Tanaka, “Japan’s Policy Agenda for East 
Asia,”Japan: East Asia Insights. Vol  2. No 
4(2007) 
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with Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia in 
the area of navigational safety and seabed 
mapping on joint research. Although 
issues pertaining to the divergence of 
interest in institutional settings, Japan is 
still moving ahead with its initiatives in 
responding to the needs of the ASEAN 
nation in term to the threats of piracy and 
maritime terrorism in the Straits and 
Southeast Asia. 
The potential for acts of piracy and 
maritime terrorism in the Straits of 
Malacca and Singapore has resulted in 
increased Japanese funding through the 
“Official Development 
Assistance”program in anti-piracy as well 
as in maritime threats from terrorism. The 
Japanese Coast Guard (JCG) has been 
patrolling through the Southeast Asian 
waters. JCG also has carried out numerous 
joint exercise training with maritime 
counterparts from the Philippines, 
Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and 
Indonesia. The Japan International 
Cooperation Agency (JICA)has been given 
the task to assist the capacity building 
programs together with the Japanese Coast 
Guard. Japan has focused primarily on 
civilian cooperation rather than military 
cooperation and has refrained from 
utilizing its Maritime Self-Defence Force 
in the region other than disaster relief 
missions and such as the Tsunami relief 
efforts in the Straits of Malacca in 2004. 
JCG is playing a major role in 
addressing the threat of piracy and armed 
robbery, smuggling and terrorism. They 
have engaged in many capacity-building 
programmes around the world as well as to 
provide trainings for major governments. 
One of the initiative taken for the Straits of 
Malacca and Singapore in assisting the 
new-formed Malaysian Maritime 
Enforcement Agency (MMEA)in capacity 
building and training programs of 
MMEApersonnel. JCG is helping MMEA 
in giving training, offering facilities and 
joint exercises. The other initiative is the 
“New Maritime Training Program”that 
had been introduced by the JCG in April 
2009. The program was launched in 2008. 
Based on this initiative, the first thirty 
personnel from Malaysia, Thailand and the 
Philippines had classified as a Maritime 
Agency organization. This joint- training 
will free from the military jurisdiction. 
The relationship between Japan and 
India existed more than 50 years ago. For 
India and Japan, the South China Sea 
dispute provides additional indicators to 
gauge the assertiveness of China’s foreign 
policy. India has unresolved borders with 
China in the Himalayas region and with 
Japan a territorial dispute in the East China 
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Sea. India also has territorial disputes with 
Pakistan, who in turn is supported by 
China. The actual and perceived economic 
and military rise of China is also bringing 
India and Japan closer together. 
India-Japan Partnership 
The Governments of India and Japan 
signed the ‘Joint Statement Vision for 
Japan-India Strategic and Global 
Partnership in the Next Decade’ and a 
‘Comprehensive Economic Partnership 
Agreement’ in October 2010.35 No doubt 
India’s naval presence in the Indian Ocean, 
from the Strait of Hormuz to the Straits of 
Malacca and Singapore, provides an 
important component for Indo-Japanese 
maritime cooperation.36 Security interests 
that are opposing of the Government of 
China are also aligning the two countries 
to more strategic engagement with the 
Association of South East Asian Nations 
(ASEAN), of which there are ten nation 
States. 
India and Japan see the emergence of 
China as a challenger to the South East 
Asia region. They believe that China will 
                                                          
35 A.Mathur, “India - Japan Relations Drivers, 
Trends and prospect,”Singapore:  RSIS. RSIS 
MONOGRAPH NO. 23(2012) 
36 India Press, “India, Japan to ‘upgrade’defence 
cooperation” 
http://indianexpress.com/article/india/indiaothers/In
diajapantoupgradedefencecooperation  [10 
Desember 2014]. 
 
rise up and generate their economy, 
modernise their defence facilities and try 
to politically re-align the region using their 
economic capabilities. For this reason, 
India believes it needs to be involved in 
this region so as to balance the rise of 
China together with USA and Japan as a 
host.37India as one of the emergence 
economic powerhouse in Asia is 
recognised as such by Japan. A survey of 
Japanese companies noted that they chose 
India as the third important countries for 
future world economy after China and 
United States.  
China and India are both robust 
economic powers and have nuclear 
capabilities. At the same time, Japan has a 
presence as the world’s third largest 
economy. As a world watches the rise of 
India and China, there are growing 
suspicious over what China’s military 
modernisation and economic buoyancy 
would translate into. Even though India is 
also an emerging new power but in 
comparison, the rise of India does not 
seem to be as worrisome for most 
countries in the world.38 This is because 
                                                          
37 M.Gaur, “ India’s Look East Policy,” FPRC. No. 
8(2011). 
38B.Goshal, “Some New Thoughts on India’s Look 
East Policy,” Institute of Peace and Conflict 
Studies. No 54.(2007) 
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India does not wish to challenge the 
existing international order. 
Japan and the Philippines 
The Government of Japan held talks 
in September 2011 with diplomats of the 
Philippines on resolving the territorial and 
sovereignty disputes in the South China 
Sea peacefully in accordance with 
international law. It proposed that the two 
countries set up a ‘permanent working 
group’ to regularly tackle disputes and 
other Asian maritime issues. Even more 
importantly, military and security ties were 
tightened with the elevation of the 
relationship to a ‘strategic partnership’.39 
Japan also displayed its willingness to play 
a greater role in regional security issues 
when the Japanese Vice-Minister of 
Defence met with senior military officials 
from the Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia 
and Thailand in late-September 2011. 
On 28 June 2013, Japan’s Minister 
of Defence offered assistance to the 
Government of Philippine when the latter 
stated that it would seek greater 
cooperation with Japan and the United 
States by offering access to its military 
bases as it seeks to counter any military 
                                                          
39 J.E Esplanada,”Philippines, Japan to enhance 
maritime security ties,” (2012) 
http://globalnation.inquirer.net/43508/philippinesja
pantoenhancemaritimesecurityties/ [11 April 2014] 
 
threats from China.40 (NST, 28 June 2013 
p.1) The Government of the Philippines 
was drafting plans whereby the US forces 
could spend more time on military bases in 
the Philippines and the same terms could 
be offered to Japan.41 
Japan was considered as a strategic 
partner in accordance with the Philippines’ 
existing diplomatic protocols. The two 
Governments agreed to further cooperate 
in terms of the defence of the remote 
islands, the territorial sea as well as 
protection of maritime interests. 
The Philippines will also be putting 
forward a proposal for avoiding future 
conflicts in the Sea at the next ASEAN 
summit. This would see claimant countries 
determine which areas are in dispute and 
which are not so as to allow for the 
exploration and exploitation of resources, 
potentially in joint ventures. 
But while outside involvement can 
guarantee some degree of protection for 
ASEAN states against China, this could be 
a dangerous game to play — one that risks 
                                                          
40M.Fackler, “To Counter China, Japan and 
Philippines Will Bolster Maritime 
Cooperation.”(2013) 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/11/world/asia/jap
anandphilippinestobolstermaritimecooperation.html
?_r=0 [November, 11 2014]. 
41 Z. Keck, ”Made in China: A USA- Japan- 
Philippenes Axis?,” 
http://thediplomat.com/flashpoints-
blog/2013/06/29/made-inchina-a-us-japan[1 Julai 
2013]. 
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a strong reaction from PRC. Indeed, 
Chinese media are already calling for such 
a reaction following Philippine President 
Aquino’s recent talks with the US and 
Japan on the one hand and China on the 
other. These talks secured US$60 billion 
of infrastructure investment from China 
but also the purchase of two Hamilton 
class cutters from the US. 
It would be easy for China to 
interpret the events during 2010/11 as 
tantamount to a strategic encirclement by 
the US, India and Japan. And this will only 
make the disputes more complicated than 
ever. Now that ASEAN claimant states 
have a more favourable strategic position 
vis-à-vis China, all the states involved 
should turn their attention to the 
negotiating table, adding substantive 
content to the agreement reached at the 
July 2011 ASEAN Regional Forum to 
resolve the dispute peacefully. The 12 
October 2011 signing of a six-point 
agreement between China and Vietnam to 
contain the South China Sea dispute, 
including the opening of a hotline to deal 
with potential conflicts and the promise of 
holding border negotiations twice a year, is 
one welcome development toward this. 
On 23 July 2013, the Third Japan-
Singapore Maritime Security Dialogue 
was held at Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
Japan. The Dialogue covered a wide range 
of issues. Both countries discussed the 
safety of navigation in vital shipping lanes 
such as the Straits of Malacca and 
Singapore, counter-piracy measures, the 
Regional Cooperation Agreement on 
Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery 
against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP), maritime 
security efforts in ASEAN and others. 
In 2013, the new Prime Minister, 
Shinzo Abe introduced new policy. It was 
democratic security diamond. From this 
policy, Abe stated that the security of 
Japan as a national identity.42 Abe wants to 
curb China’s growing military and 
commercial clout in this region.43 He 
wants to develop Japan’s maritime 
competence and combine it with the 
country’s economic strengths.44 His main 
idea is to curtail China’s strived for 
hegemony. For that purpose, Japan has 
cooperation with Australia, India, Japan, 
and the US state of Hawaii to form a 
diamond to safeguard the maritime 
                                                          
42 Y. Hayashi, “Abe’s Diamond Defense 
Diplomacy,”The World Street 
Journal.http://blogs.wsj.com/japanrealtime/2013/0
1/17/abes-diamond-defense-diplomacy [March, 24 
2013]. 
43 A.P Liff, “ Japan’s Defense Policy: Abe the 
Evolutionary,” The Washington Quarterly 38(2) 
(2015): 79–99. 
44 T.Sekiguchi, “Abe Defends New Japan Defense 
Policy: Nation's Pacifist Constitution Continues to 
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http://www.wsj.com/articles/abedefendsnewdefens
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commons stretching from the Indian 
Ocean region to the Western Pacific.  
Conclusion 
The South China Sea basin is 
blessed with potential abundant marine 
biotic and mineral resources with 
numerous islets and reefs and extensive 
coastlines of the littoral States along which 
there are numerous fishing communities, 
cities and coastal resorts. It also the key 
sea routes for maritime shipping and naval 
mobility. Because of its important location 
as a strategic shipping and aeronautical 
route between east and west, it becomes a 
target of contention among the littoral 
States and other external actors.. 
In the Asia-Pacific region, as inter-
dependence widens and deepens, countries 
are strengthening their cooperation with 
each other to resolve security challenges, 
for example, India and Japan and Japan 
and the Philippines. In particular, specific 
cooperative measures are being undertaken 
to resolve challenges in the non-traditional 
security field. The global shift in the 
balance of power is apparent in the Asia-
Pacific region and the potential stage 
settings are the East China and South 
China Seas. Large-scale military forces, 
including nuclear forces, continue to be 
concentrated in the areas surrounding 
Japan, and many countries are 
modernising their military forces and 
increasing their military activities. In 
addition, there remain unclear and 
uncertain elements in the region, such as 
disputes over territories and the maritime 
domain.  
The Government of Japan believes it 
must remain a leading promoter of rules 
for trade, investment, intellectual property, 
labor, environment and security as the 
Asia-Pacific or the Indo-Pacific regions 
become more and more prosperous. It 
must continue to be a guardian of the 
global commons, like the maritime 
commons, open enough to benefit 
everyone. It must work even more closely 
with the U.S., Korea, Australia and other 
like-minded democracies throughout the 
region. 
Despite the concerns of Japan in the 
South China Sea the Government of Japan 
is investing more into people to people 
exchanges between Japan and China. 
Japan's relations with China stand out as 
among the most important. The doors are 
always open on my side for the Chinese 
leaders. That is the politicians view which 
does not necessarily translate to the day to 
day events that take place on the high seas 
and in particular in the South China Sea 
  
Noraini bt Zulkifli & Vivian Louise Forbes | Japan and the South China Sea 
Andalas Journal of International Studies| Vol 5 No 1 Mei Tahun 2016 81 
 
References 
Aaron Sheldrick and Kentaro Hamada 
‘Japan says building nuclear safety 
culture will take a long time’05-
Jul-13: 
Ahn, B. J. 2004. The Rise of China and 
the Future of East Asian 
Integration.Asia-Pacific Review, 
Vol. 11, No. 2 
Atanassova- Cornelis. E. 2010. The US-
Japan Alliance and the Rise of 
China:  Implications  for 
the East Asian Security order and 
the EU's Regional Role. 
 Brussels: Paper for the 
International Conference. 
Chen, S. 2010. ‘China’s Self-Extrication 
from the “Malacca Dilemma” and 
 Implications’. International 
Journal of Chinese Studies.Vol. 1, 
No. 1,  January 2010, pp. 1-24 
Christofferson, G. 2009. Japan and The 
East Asian Maritime Security 
order: prospect for trilateral and 
multilateral cooperation. Asian 
Perspective. Vol.33, no.3 
Chuter, J. 2013.Security Diamond. 
Retrieved from 
http://www.marsecreview.com/201
3/01/security-diamond [July 15, 
2012] 
Evers, H.D. & Gerke,S. 2005. The 
Strategic Importance of the Straits 
of Malacca for  
World Trade and Regional Development. 
Jerman: University of Bonn 
Forbes, V.L. 2001 Conflict and 
Cooperation in Managing 
Maritime Space in Semi-enclosed 
Seas, Singapore: Singapore 
University Press, 382 + xviii pages, 
Lin Sien (Ed.) Southeast Asia 
Transformed,A Geography of 
Change, Singapore: Institute of 
South East Asian Studies, Chapter 
2, pp 47-94 
Fravel, M. T., dan Liebman, A. 2011. 
‘Beyond the moat: the plan’s 
evolving interests and potential 
influence’. In Saunders, P. C, 
Yung, C, Swaine, M, and 
Yang,N.Z. (ed.) The Chinese navy 
expanding capabilities, evolving 
roles.Washington: National 
Defense University Press 
Green, M. J. 2009.  Asia in the Debate on 
American Grand Strategy”, Naval 
War  College Review, Retrieved 
from 
http://www.usnwc.edu/Publications
/Naval-War-College-Review/2009-
--Winter.aspx [July 15, 2013] 
Hoadley,S. & Ruland, J. 2006. Asian 
Security Reassessed. Singapore: 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies 
Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 
2013. Tokyo. [online version] 
http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pd
f/2013/01.pdf<accessed 3 August 
2013> 
Jatswan, S. S & Balakrisnan, K. S. 
2008.Trends in Maritime Security 
and Geopolitics  in Southeast 
Asia.In. The Seas Divide: 
Geopolitics and Maritime Issues 
 in  Southeast Asia. 
Kuala Lumpur: Institute of Ocean 
and Earth Sciences. pp1-7 
Noraini bt Zulkifli & Vivian Louise Forbes | Japan and the South China Sea 
Andalas Journal of International Studies| Vol 5 No 1 Mei Tahun 2016 82 
 
Kesavan, K. V. 2011. Japan and ASEAN: 
Their Changing Security Relations. 
New  Delhi: Observer Research 
Foundation 
Kondapalli, S. 2005. The Rise of China & 
Implications to Asia. International 
Convention Centre Taipei, Taiwan 
 
Kotani, T. 2012. Struggle over EZZs: 
Japan's Interests in South China 
Sea.MIMA  Conference Report. 
 
Kyung, L. Move over Japan: China is 
now No. 2 world economy. 
Retrieved from 
http://money.cnn.com/2011/02/13/
news/international/china_overtakes
_japan_economy.cnnw/index.htm 
[July 16, 2013] 
Lam, P. E & Narayanan, G. 2008. China 
and East Asia: Mutual 
Accommodation. In. Lam,  P. E 
& Dürkop, C.East Asia's Relations 
with a Rising China. Japan: 
 Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung 
Liss, C. 2010. The Privatisation of 
Maritime Security- Maritime 
Security in Southeast  Asia: 
Between a rock and a hard 
place?Perth: Murdoch University. 
Asia  Research paper 
Mashashi, N. 2003.Japan's Political and 
Security Relations with ASEAN. 
Tokyo:  Japan Centre for 
International Exchange 
Mathur, A. 2012. India - Japan Relations 
Drivers, Trends and prospect. 
Singapore:  RSIS. RSIS 
MONOGRAPH NO. 23 
Mohd Hazmi Rusli. 2011. The Legal 
Feasibility of the Imposition of a 
Traffic  Limitation  Scheme in 
Straits Used for International 
Navigation: A Study of  the 
Straits of  Malacca and 
Singapore. International Journal of 
Humanities  and Social Science 
Vol.1 No.6 
Mokhzani Zubir&Mohd Nizam Basiron. 
2005. The Straits of Malacca: the 
Rise of China,  America’s 
Intentions and the Dilemma of the 
Littoral States. MIMA 
Oros, A.L. 2010. Japan’s Security Future. 
The Routledge Handbook of Asian 
Security Studies. London: 
Routledge  
Pumphrey, C.W (Ed). 2002. The rise of 
China in Asia: Security 
Implications. U.S. Army War 
College 
Raj, A. 2009.Japan's Initiatives in 
Security Cooperation in the Straits 
of Malacca on  maritime 
security and in Southeast Asia: 
Piracy and Maritime 
Terrorism.The  Japan 
Institute for International Affairs 
(JIIA) 
Rathus, J.M. 2010.Japan response to the 
rise of China: Implication to 
regional Institution. Australia: 
University of Adelaide 
Rusdi Omar. 2006. ‘China dan Kuasa 
Hegemoni Baru Ekonomi’.  
 Retrieved from http:// 
 www.ijms.uum.edu.my/ijm
s 14(1). [6 December 2012] 
Samuels, R. J. 2008. Tokyo grand 
strategy and the future of East Asia 
securing Japan. London: Cornell 
University Press 
Noraini bt Zulkifli & Vivian Louise Forbes | Japan and the South China Sea 
Andalas Journal of International Studies| Vol 5 No 1 Mei Tahun 2016 83 
 
Sien, C. L.1998. The Importance of the 
Straits of Malacca and 
Singapore.Singapore  Journal of 
International & Comparative Law 
Spittena, L.2006. “The Malacca 
Dilemma” —countering China’s 
“string of pearls”  
with land-based airpower. Alabama: Air 
University (USAF) 
Tanaka, H. 2007. Japan's Policy Agenda 
for East Asia. Japan: East Asia 
Insights. Vol  2. No 4 
Tanaka, H. 2008. Nationalistic Sentiment 
in Japan and Their Foreign Policy 
 Implications. Japan: East 
Asia Insights. Vol.2, No 1 
Tang, S.M.2007. Japan’s Grand Strategic 
Shift from Yoshida to Koizumi: 
Reflections on Japan’s Strategic 
Focus in the 21st century. 
Akademika vol 70. Bil 1 
UNCTAD. 2011. Review of Maritime 
Transport.  
Vavro, C. 2008. Piracy, Terrorism and 
the Balance of Power in the 
Malacca Strait  
(vol 4, no 1 (spring) Canadian Naval 
Review) 
Wan Siti Adibah, Zinatul Ashiqin, Noor 
Inayah &Noridayu. 2012. 
Corporate Social 
 Responsibility (csr) from 
Shipping Companies in the Straits 
of Malacca and  Singapore. 
International Journal of Business 
and Society, Vol. 13 No. 2 
Yu, H. 2009. China's Perspectives on the 
Straits of Malacca. In Nazery 
Khalid  (edt.).  Proceeding of the 
6th MIMA International 
Conference on the  Straits of 
Malacca: Charting the Future, pp 
22-24. MIMA 
Energy International Agency. 2013.  Oil 
and Gas Emergency Response of 
EIA Country. Retrieved from  
https://www.iea.org/publications/fr
eepublications/publication/2013_O
SS_Japan.pdf [August 18, 
2016]Analysis Report on Japan. 
2013. Retrieved from 
http://www.connaissancedesenergi
es.org/sites/default/files/pdf-pt-
vue/anlysis_report_on_japan.pdf[A
ugust 18, 2016]Japan and The South 
China Sea 
